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2Abstract
The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was launched in 2009 after an 
extensive and inclusiveconsultation process lead by the European Commission; however, 
during the implementation phase un-clarities in its leadership responsibilities emerged.   
The thesis adopts a case study design with the aim of examining the EUSBSR leadership 
structure,more precisely the European Commission’s leadership role and how they handle and 
consider this role. Theoretical conceptualization is achieved by linking theories of leadership 
with the ‘path dependency’ theory in a framework for identifying the complex structures and 
leadership “issues” within which the European Commission upholds its leadership role.  
   The main findings include that the European Commission as an institutional entrepreneur in 
the development of the EUSBSR and that, in the implementation phase of the EUSBSR their 
leadership role has been developed path dependently. The thesis concludes that more research 
on leadership of macro-regional strategies is required and emphasizes the benefits of linking 
leadership and ‘path dependency’ concepts. 
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51. INTRODUCTION
In December 2007 the European Council called upon the European Commission to initiate the 
work on a Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The task was delegated to DG Regio, the EU 
Directorate for Regional and Urban Policy, with a request to develop the first macro-regional 
strategy. The deadline was set in June 2009. In this process the Commission gained
substantial input for the direction and structure of the strategy, in turn yielding increased 
legitimacy for the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) by the 
member countries: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia.
    The birth of the EUSBSR can be traced to European Council conclusions in December 
2007, which called for a rapid response to the urgent environmental challenge in the Baltic
Sea (Metzeger and Schmitt 2011:271). The environmental issue was the starting point, 
however, due to the density and character of the institutional map of the Baltic the Strategy 
got a wider scope in order to attract a wider range of these organizations.
     Parallel to the process at of development of the Strategy, Sweden was preparing for the 
Presidency starting in June 2009 and as one of its main priorities to get the strategy adopted 
during its Presidency, see for instance the Presidency work program (Swedish Government 
2009) and speeches by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Minister for EU Affairs Cecilia 
Malmström (Reinfeldt 2009, Malmström 2009 in Bengtsson 2009:2). As part of this work a 
national specialist was sent to the DG Regio team to work with the development of the 
strategy. By June 2009 the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was endorsed 
and the aim was accomplished, according to the schedule.
      Since the leadership role of the European Commission is the selected area of study,there is 
a need to give an account of that role and the responsibilities. The role, which has been placed 
on the Commission, grants extensive influence within the governance system of the EUSBSR. 
In other words, it can be seen as one of the actors with formal authority to resolve and address 
key issues within the system. In addition, the DG for Regional Policy within the Commission, 
in cooperation with other Commission services, is responsible for the general coordination, 
monitoring and reporting to the European Council (European Commission 2013). 
61.1 Leadership complexities in EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
A relevant part of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) is its 
leadership. At this point it is therefore important to clarify why the Commission is referred to 
as the leader when the individual Member States are responsible for the EUSBSR 
implementation and to do the real job. That complex leadership structure of the EUSBSR
needs to explained and clarified in this section. 
      Initially, the request from the European Council to the European Commission implied 
only development of the Strategy, however, at a later stage they were expected to take a more 
overall responsibility for the leading of the Strategy; in the implementation they ended up 
with a greater responsibility than expected. Since February 2013 the roles and responsibilities 
of the stakeholders are formally adopted and regulated in the newly revised Action Plan 
(European Commission 2013),nevertheless, the Commission upholds a greater responsibility
in practice. From their perspective, they are not the leaders and are only taking enhanced 
responsibility when some Member State do not do its job properly; it should not even be an 
issue if the Member States were taking the adequate responsibility regulated in the Action 
Plan (European Commission 2013). 
It seems like there were a need for an overarching responsibility after the adoption of the
strategy. That is a possible reason why the Commission ended up in that position. Considering 
the transformation from the development of the Strategy to the implementation, adding ‘the 
three no’s’, the expectation that it would all have been done by itself is rather surprising. 
Metzger and Schmidt (2011:273) give their explanation: 
“What appears to have occurred is that the development and adoption of the Strategy has created a demand for 
the installation of new modes of governance in order, literally, to `fill' the organizational and institutional 
vacuum which has emerged as a result of the singularization of the region in one clearly formulated and aligned 
version accepted by a multitude of engaged actors, who now appear to see it as the responsibility of the emerging 
designated regional spokesperson (the Commission) to secure the stability and further integration of the 
solidifying spatial entity which is emerging as an outcome of the process”. 
7This is a leadership role thatthe Commission wants to leave without an answer to the question 
of who should take over since there is a need for an actor or a leadership structure with high 
level of trust and an ability to take responsibility for the Baltic Sea Region as a whole. 
Since the Strategy was built on ‘the three no’s’ principle: no new funding, no new legislation
and no new institutions (Bengtsson 2009), but seeks to better coordinate and make more 
efficient use of resources already allocated in various areas and projects, it implies that the 
Commission will work with a whole array of governmental and non-governmental actors. In 
other words, occupy a very influential, but complex position. This serves as an introduction to 
complex structures within which Commission needs to navigate. In other words, these 
leadership dilemmas of the Commission, within the European Union Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, are the selected area of study.
1.2 Purpose and research question
Researchingthe Baltic Sea Strategy and communicating to stakeholders I came across a 
structural problem concerning the management of the strategy. The contradiction implied that 
the Commission, in practice, has an overall responsibility for the steering and leading of the 
strategy, however,formally this is not their responsibility.Since the research question should 
reflect something interesting and puzzling with the European Union Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region (EUSBSR), the leadership rolethat the Commission’s is trapped into is suitable 
case. Subsequently the research question will be based on this contradiction. 
     More precisely, the purpose of this study is to examine the leadership role of the 
Commission in the development of the Strategy as well as in the later implementation phase. 
In the development phase I will give an account of the Commission as an ‘entrepreneurial 
leader’. Nevertheless, once EUSBSR was completed the Commission was expected to 
shoulder greaterleadership responsibilities. This change marks the entering into phase and role
of the Commission which is more problematic and complex. In this thesis the role and
perspective of the Commission is central,therefore the research questions are based on their 
accounts. To examine why or how the Commission ended up with its present responsibilities 
is less interesting; the implications of this leadership is central. Secondly, Commission’s 
8approach towards this responsibility in terms of how they consider and handle that role in the 
development, as well as, in the implementation phase. 
The research questions are: 
1. What leadership role is upheld by the European Commission in the European Union 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region?
2. How does the European Commission consider and handle its leadership role in the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region?
The Commission’s consideration and handling of the leadership role is central because it may 
say something about the cooperation as a whole, the problems it is facing and raise some 
questions about the future of the strategy. The Commission would like to pass on the 
responsibility and there is a lack of interest from the stakeholders to take a greater leadership 
role, except during their Presidencies. It is of great interest to examine the Commission’s 
approach in this search for possible leadership solutions of the EUSBSR; are they ready to 
leave its role directly or are they taking or actively searching for a solution before they step 
back? 
1.3 Previous research
The purpose if this thesis is to study an area of the EUSBSR which has so far only briefly 
been covered, namely the leadership. A number of studies have been conducted on the 
initiation of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region as well ason the 
development of theMacro-regional strategiesusing the EUSBSRas a case and these are central 
areasof study which I need to relate to. 
91.3.1 Relevance and contribution of this thesis
It becomes clear that previousresearch on the EUSBSR in particular focuses on the aim of the 
strategy and its potential success or failure. Naturally, since EUSBSR was adopted in 2009, 
however, there must be more to add concerning the added value of the Strategy. Although 
parts of previous research touch upon the divisions of power, there seems to be a lack of 
deeper consideration of the leadership aspects of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region. Here the study of leadership of EUSBSR seems particularly relevant. Underdal 
states that some traditions within leadership studies are concerned primarily with the 
instrumental mode of leadership than with capabilities and structures. The challenge is then, 
to transpose and integrate findings and propositions from other settings and different 
traditions of research into a comprehensive framework (Underdal 1994:194). In this case, the 
comprehensive framework have been applied to leadership analysis of the EUSBSR
      Finally, the thesis should be considered as an attempt to further the (limited) leadership 
analysis within the EUSBSR building on previous research and thus hoping to make a 
valuable contribution to this field. 
1.4 Disposition
The first chapter has framed the research problem and presented the aim and the questions 
that will be pursued in this thesis. In the second chapter the main theories of leadership and 
‘path dependency’are put forward together with a theoretical framework linking the two
concepts. The operationalization of the theoretical concepts that will be utilized in the analysis 
is as well presented in this section. The following third chapter consist of the methodological 
approach and the material that will be used. 
     Chapter four outlines the leadership structures of the EUSBSR in order to serve as an 
introduction to the complexities of the cooperation while chapter five constitutes the answers 
to the first research question of the thesis. The sixth chapter presents some answers to the 
second research question, namely, how the Commission consider and handle its leadership 
role within the EUSBSR while in chapter seven the political prestige and commitment of the 
EUSBSR is analyzed. The eighth and final chapter will present the conclusions of the 
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analysis, by answering the research questions of European Commission’s leadership role and 
their approach towards this role. In additional it will also present some reflections concerning 
the theoretical approach and its usefulness in relation to the research aim.  
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2. THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the analytical framework which will be employed 
for the analysis. This chapter will be divided in sub-sections. To begin with, leadership theory 
and the concept of an institutional entrepreneur will be presented and briefly related to its 
applications on the EUSBSR. I will then move on to give an overview of ‘path dependency’ 
and institutional development as well as indications on for what reasons this theory is 
applicable on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Finally, I will explain how these 
theories will serve as a framework for the analysis of the EUSBSR, first macro-regional 
strategy. 
2.1 Leadership theory
In order to examine the role of the leadership in the EUSBSR leadership theory will be the 
analytical tool. The applied definition: “leadership is defined to mean broadly any action by 
one actor to guide the behavior of others towards a certain goal” (Underdal 1994:178). That is 
the definition of leadership which that later analysis will be based on. 
Studies of leadership have by large paid more attention to the supply side than to the demand 
for leadership services. For one thing, leaders tend to be more fascinating objects of study 
than followers. Therefore the previous definition will be completed with the following: 
“leadership is a relationship between leader and followers. The strength of this relationship 
may be seen as a function of the supply of and the demand for leadership services…the 
followers are prepared to let themselves be led only in a particular direction and perhaps only 
in a certain fashion” (Underdal 1994:181-3). This indicates a conditional interplay; without 
the demand from the followers there will be no leadership role to uphold. On the other hand, 
since leadership is a relationship shaped by supply and demand, a missing piece may, as well,
be the supply of leadership by the leader. Here the reluctant leader of the EUSBSR enters the 
stage: European Commission. There is a lack of supply of leadership of the EUSBSR but 
there is a demand of leadership from the EUSBSR stakeholders. This leadership still exists to 
some extent but is uphold reluctantly, however, for what reasons will be described at a later 
point in time. Just as an indication, I will come back to the issue, it is related to the division of 
12
responsibilities within the strategy: the Commission thinks that they need to cover up for 
things that should be done by the Member States themselves.    
     Returning to the role of the followers, the stakeholders of the EUSBSR are free to leave
the cooperation; it is not legally binding in any sense. For instance, such a reason could be
that the common ground, on which the cooperation is based, differs vastly from their 
perception or if the leadership format or style. It may, however, be politically impossible but 
that is another thing. Based on this discussion Underdal states that: “the notion of a joint 
purpose also implies that leadership cannot be based only on coercion, let alone brute force. 
There must be a platform of shared values, interests, and beliefs and successful leadership 
builds on and cultivates this platform” (1994:179). In a sense this quote cover well the notion 
on what the EUSBSR is based; without binding legislation there may even be no coercion or 
brutal force. The common ground, on which the EUSBSR is based, is that enhanced 
cooperation is the best way to meet the challenges in the Baltic Sea Region to fulfill the set-up 
targets in the strategy.  Finally, a particular instance of leadership may be confined to one 
single project, but as defined here it must at least be a fairly consistent pattern of interaction 
extending throughout a certain period of time where the EUSBSR is applicable. As a 
conclusion of this section, leadership in this thesis should be understood in line with these
definitions presented, the leadership role application in EUSBSR will be further evolved and 
refined in the analysis. 
At this point there are two notes of importance to bring up. To begin with,Underdal’s (1994) 
definition of leadership is developed and applied in an understanding of intergovernmental 
negotiations at the EU level, however, in this thesis they will be applicable to the endorsement 
and implementation of a macro-regional strategy. Due to the open nature of the definitions of 
leadership it is applicable to a wide range of areas of study, including the analysis of 
EUSBSR. Secondly, a crucial factor here is who is referred to as leader and since this is the 
key area of study, which is due to constant negotiations, there may be un-clarities which will 
be clarified throughout the thesis. Nevertheless, the starting point is that the Commission is 
the leader. What kind of leader will be developed and seems, additionally, be an issue of 
continuous negotiations. The Commission as an entrepreneurial leader is something I will 
come back to shortly.  
     How can we measure the level of influence of the Commission in the development of
EUSBSR? In general, the simplest method is to measure the correlation between the 
preferences and proposals put forward by the EU institutions and negotiating outcomes. “High 
levels of correlation would imply that the EU institution had a high level of influence….If a 
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Commission proposals merely anticipated what a winning coalition of Member States would 
have accepted anyway, this would clearly not be an example of Commission influence over 
outcomes” (Beach 2005:12). However, in the case of the EUSBSR negotiations the format is 
totally different from an Intergovernmental Conference, for instance. Rather, in the EUSBSR, 
the Commission assembled all the comments from the Member States and put forward a 
proposal acceptable for all, which was, after minor changes, endorsed. Thus this indicates that 
we have come across another type of leadership, that will be further developed in in a 
following section, namely the institutional entrepreneur. 
2.1.1 The Institutional entrepreneur 
Of importance to bear in mind is that since EUSBSR is based on ‘the three no’s, namely, a 
strategy with nonew budget, legislation or institution. In relation to this, no clear-cut 
negotiations takes place and no traditional leadership is expected or needed. In addition, the 
management of the EUSBSR is shared with multi-level stakeholders. All these factors support 
the notion that the management of the EUSBSR needs to be analyzed in other terms than a 
clear-cut rational choice institutionalism.  
      Leadership aiming at securing a more efficient agreement involves agenda-shaping and 
brokerage tactics to create an agreeable deal, helping the parties overcome bargaining 
impediments (Tallberg 2003; Young 1991:293-8). In the literature this is termed 
entrepreneurial leadership by Young and Instrumental leadership by Underdal (Underdal 
1994; Young 1991:293-8). Even though the understanding is the same, for practical reasons, 
the term entrepreneurial leadership will be used. 
What do the entrepreneurial leaders do to help the participants in institutional bargaining 
processes? For the most part, “they function as (1) agenda setters shaping the form in which 
issues are presented for consideration at the international level, (2) popularizes drawing 
attention to the importance of the issues at stake, (3) inventors devising innovative policy 
options to overcome bargaining impediments, and (4) brokers making deals and lining up 
support for salient options” (Young 2001:294). This point provides an opening for the various 
roles the entrepreneurial leaders uphold. In this thesis two different roles, in two different 
processes, of the Commission will be analyzed: the development of the strategy and the 
implementation of the strategy. In the development of the Strategy Young’s forth point is 
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especially applicable, however, during the implementation of the strategy the role is not that 
easy identifiable.    
      It becomes a little more complex in the case of entrepreneurs who work for 
intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations that are unlikely to emerge as parties to 
institutional arrangements in their own right, “a fact that heightens the importance of the 
observation that entrepreneurial leaders are often willing (and sometimes even eager) to take 
their compensation in intangible currencies such as prestige, political influence in domestic 
arenas, or progress toward the achievement of some larger personal goal”(Young 2001:297).
2.2 Path dependency
Continuing on the selected path will lead to ‘increasing returns’, or positive feedback, which 
would not be the case if one would change the path and start from the beginning again. Are 
increasing returns applicable to EUSBSR, its structural issues and the role of the 
Commission? EUSBSR, including its content and priorities, could be seen as a kind of 
institutional setting referred to as the selection of one ‘path’. Walking down that path the 
EUSBSR community realized that there are structural issues that limit the possibility to 
achieve increased returns, enhanced efficiency and results. In such a position it may be 
impossible to return and chose a more suitable institutional setting or leadership division, the 
problems are built into the strategy. Due to increasing returns, you have to continue on the 
selected path, and it iscomplicated to change the role of the Commission since it would upset 
the affected stakeholders. Adding to this picture, we have the Commission as the reluctant 
leader of the EUSBSR, partly because they do more that their assigned tasks. 
In the analysis of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region the concept of ‘path dependency’
is a helpful framework. It is increasingly common for political scientists to describe political 
processes as ‘path dependent’ where the patterns of timing and sequence are central. The 
concept will be applied to the earlier phases of the development of the EUSBSR and the 
strategy itself is a political project. In other words, we cannot understand a particular political 
process without understanding “how it got there” – the path it took. In addition, once the 
Strategy was introduced it would be virtually impossible to reverse by itself due to, for 
instance, political prestige.  
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    The definition of the concept is not strict and tends to fluctuate between a broader and a 
narrower conception. In the broader version ‘path dependency’ implies “what happened at an 
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a 
later point in time” (Sewell 1996:262-3). The general notion of Sewell’s loose definition is 
that “history matters”, however, lacking an aspect of a process which would be difficult to 
exit. An alternative, narrower definition has been suggested by Margaret Levi (1997:28):
“Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, 
the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, 
rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is 
possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other-and essential if the chosen branch dies-the branch on 
which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow”. 
This conception of ‘path dependency’ explains very well in what way an initiated political 
process may be very difficult to reverse, the usage of the metaphor of the tree adds to that. 
There may also be more gains following the initiated path so therefore the idea of increasing 
returns is central here. In such a process, the probability of further steps along the same path 
increases with each move down that path. This is because the “relative benefits of the current 
activity compared with other possible options increase over time. To put it a different way, the 
costs of exit of switching to some previously plausible alternative-rise. Increasing returns 
processes can also be described as self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes” 
(Pierson2000:252). The choice is now between the broader or the narrower definition of path 
dependency. Often, authors are not clear about which definition they employ therefore I 
would like to clearly state that in this thesis the narrower definition – that social processes 
exhibit increasing returns – will be applied. The reasons behind this decision was that the 
wider definition does not explain, in the case of the EUSBSR, that what happened in time of 
the set-up influenced later developments and outcomes at a later point in time. However, 
adding the aspects of the increasing returns along with the costs, political and economically, 
of reversal gives an interesting analysis of the EUSBSR. In other words, once the Strategy and 
the framework was decided the processes of developing the Strategy, involving and engaging
the stakeholders developed path dependently, the cooperation itself has given added value and 
the costs of exit of the strategy are becoming higher as the time is passing. In addition, once 
the role of the Commission was established in relation to the Strategy there were expectations 
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on this commitment and with the passage of time it becomes every time more difficult for the 
Commission to leave this responsibility.     
    In the applicability of increasing returns argument three characteristics of politics change 
the picture considerably: “the absence or weakness of efficiency-enhancing mechanisms of 
competition and learning; the shorter time horizons of political actors; and the strong status 
quo bias generally built into political institutions. Each of these features makes increasing 
returns processes in politics particularly intense” (Pierson 2000:257). All these features 
increase the difficulty of reversing the course actors have started. 
2.2.1 The institutional development 
The EUSBSR is a macro-regional strategy becoming more institutionalised over the passage 
of time. In this section the institutions are treated as the objects of study. The formal political 
institutions are the object of study - which can be defined as codified rules of political 
contestation. The central questions in such an analysis are (1) What determines the choice of 
particular formal institutions? and (2) What determines how institutions, once created, change 
over time? (Pierson 2004:104). In the present analysis it is mainly the second question which 
is of interest in relation to the governance of the EUSBSR and, therefore, supports the shift 
from focus on institutional choice to institutional development. Rationalist approaches focus 
almost exclusively on what determines the choice of a particular formal institution and work 
backwards from the institutional set-up to develop an account of how the institutions were (or 
might have been) rationally chosen (Pierson 2004:104).  The latter theory supports the claim 
that “a particular institution exists because it is expected to serve the interests of those who 
created it…while societal functionalism maintains that a particular institution X exists 
because it constitutes an effective response to some kind of societal problem” (Pierson 
2004:105). The latter belongs to the sociological and historical institutionalism 
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2.4 Theoretical framework complementing leadership with path dependency
Since ‘path dependency’ and leadership theory cover very different areas the theoretical 
framework will be set up in a way to complement each other.A suitable structure is to let the 
leadership theory be the analytical tool for the early phase in the establishment of the Strategy 
and the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ that the Commission conducted in the development process.
Apparently, the Commission holds a leadership role in the development of EUSBSR,however, 
here the focus will be mainly on the role, not on the process. In this chapter the first research 
question will be answered. 
The ‘path dependency’ theory will be the analytical framework for time after the adoption of 
the Strategy, the second phase,when the Commission had fulfilled their task in the 
development and they were expected to take a greater role in the actual running of the 
Strategy.However, Commission’s leadership role in the second phase will only be briefly 
analyzed. At this point, it is the second research question that will be answered therefore there 
will be no longer a focus on the role but how the Commission handle and consider its 
leadership responsibilities. The ‘path dependency’ is a helpful analytical tool in this phase for 
investigating the leadership rolethey are trapped into and difficulties to diminishtheir
leadership responsibilities. In addition, in the chapter on political commitment and prestige, 
included in the second research question,‘path dependency’ will serve as the analytical tool. 
Finally, as an clarification, there are two phases of the EUSBSR that will analyzed: the 
development and the implementation of the Strategy. The first research question examining 
the leadership role of the Commission in placed in the first phase of the EUSBSR but is only
briefly applied at the second phase. In this chapter the leadership theory will be applied. The 
second research question analyzing how the Commission handle and consider its leadership 
role is placed in the second phase, the implementation of the EUSBSR, and the ‘path 
dependency’ theory will be used. The chapter on political commitment and prestige is 
included in the latter framework. 
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3. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is describing and motivating the methodological choices I did to 
carry out this research. The initial section describes the research design, while the following 
contains an account to the method. The explorative research method is the general approach 
applicable to interviews and document analysis. I will conclude the chapter with some 
considerations over strengths and weaknesses of the selected approach. 
3.1 Case study as a research design
This research ambition of this thesis is to be explorative, descriptive and explanatory. To be 
more precise, the present study is a qualitative case study. In the study of the leadership 
structure within the EUSBSR a case study suitable. Case studies are: “analysis of persons, 
events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied 
holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an 
instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame - an object – within which 
the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates” (Thomas, 2011: 513).  
Case studies within social sciences are utilized for their strength in areas where statistical 
methods or formal models are weak (George and Benett 2005:19). This quote gives an 
indication of the approach and selection of method that has been chosen. A classic critique 
addressed to case studies is their low theoretical, mainly because the most radical detractors 
claim it is impossible to draw generalization on the basis of a single case (Yin, 2003: 10-1). 
However, today this statement is almost overcome because many authors have shown how 
case studies might be theoretically worthy, especially if in the right research design.
     An explorative case study, where the aim is toheuristicallydevelop the subject, will be 
applied. Since previous research projects on the Commission leadership role of EUSBSR are 
limited in number the explorative approach has been chosen in order to extend, and gain 
access to, information not available today. In addition the official documents on the EUSBSR, 
naturally, rarely cover leadership issues or complexities have to gather information elsewhere,
preferably in interviews with officials working directly with the Strategy. By the conduction 
of eight interviews with EUSBSR officials and the DG Regio officials from the Baltoc 
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Team(all of them, except one official) extensive information have been gathered on the 
leadership of the EUSBSR. Of importance to note is that I have been able to collect new 
information on the European Commission’s leadership role that, most probably, is not 
available or resaerched previously. 
     When the purpose of this research is to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or acquire new 
insight in order to formulate a more precise problem or develop hypothesis, the exploratory 
(or heuristic) studies are suitable (Stenelo 1984). The advantage of qualitative studies is that it 
allows the researcher to collect data from as many aspects as the situation requires. In 
addition, according to Stenelo (1984:26) the manipulation of the input variables are reduced 
and a greater openness is created for the results. Another advantage in case studies is that the 
analytic freedom of action may be retained longer in the research process. An aim to strive for 
the researcher is not to reject new ideas in later stages of the research process. According to 
Guba (1978:70) “…premature closure is a sin, tolerance of ambiguity is a virtue”. This 
working process approach has been applied in order to gain the maximum usage of the 
material collected.  
3.2 Method: semi-structured interviews
Exploratory research is flexible and can address research questions of all types (what, why, 
how, who, when, where). Among the qualitative research techniques I have selected the semi-
structured (telephone) interviews based on exploratory and narrative interview techniques. 
The semi-structured approach provides more freedom for adoption to the knowledge of the 
interviewee and ensures that all the most relevant topics have been covered (Richards 
1996:201). 
     The interviews were recorded and transcribed since it enabled me to concentrate more on 
what the interviewee said, however, there are advantages and disadvantages that need to be 
considered: interaction, transcription and interpretation (May 2003:138). These aspects are 
always central when it comes to interviews and careful interpretation of the interviewees is 
crucial; the interviewer must constantly be aware that the information the interviewee is 
supplying can often be of a highly subjective nature (Richards 1996:201). In other words, 
interviewing should not be conducted with a view to establishing the “the truth”, in a crude, 
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positivist manner Richards (1996:200). In the cases where the answers of the interviewees 
differ this will be considered as a finding by its own right. 
      The interviews have been conducted through telephone due to greater flexibility and less 
logistical issues this format has been a clear advantage. It is no doubt also a question of 
accessibility. The issue of interaction during interviews, as previously mentioned, is important 
to address. The fact that it was conducted through telephone, at least to some extend have 
limited the possible ofinfluence or interplay between the researcher and interviewee.The 
interviews are transcribed (and available on request) and cited in the thesis but will also in 
general serve as a source of information complemented with official documents. In addition, 
the interviews in this thesis will not just be considered in relation to their validity but instead 
as an instrument for gaining information, obviously, complemented by the official documents. 
    There may be the case that questions will not be answered (or simply avoided) for political 
or ethical reasons and especially in the case when they are referring to their own working 
place (May 2003:128). All the interviewees where asked if they preferred to be anonymous 
and, interestingly enough, all the representatives from the Commission requested anonymity 
while the national stakeholders didn’t. In the analysis, when applying the interviewees’ 
responses, the relation between the position, the choice for anonymity and the level of 
political correctness will be kept in mind.
3.2.1 Working hypotheses-table
Exploratory research helps determine the best research design, data collection method and 
selection of subjects. This method has indeed been helpful in this process through the 
generation of formal hypotheses. These hypotheses are based on a theory and serve as a 
guidance of “where to search” for information with the aim of filling the gaps in the research 
material. “If the theory happens to be too general or too specific, a hypothesis cannot be 
formulated, therefore exploratory research is felt to gain experience that will be helpful in 
formulating relevant hypothesis for more definite investigation” (Shields and Tajalli 
2006:320). The working hypotheses are constructed using information from the literature. 
     The working hypotheses are “provisional, working means of advancing investigation”; 
they lead to discovery of other critical facts” (Dewey 1938:142). The combination of the 
EUSBSR literature and my pre-assumptions on the leadership of the strategy served as a tool 
for advancing the research. Along the interview process the hypotheses were further evolved 
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and redefined, thus adapted to the responses of the interviewees. There has been a process of 
constant rewriting of the questions and the hypotheses due to adaptation to the remaining 
interviews, however, these are only used for the aim of creating interview questions. The 
reason for this is that the aim of heuristic research is to gather information and a prerequisite 
is to pose the most adequate questions on the most crucial aspects of a certain issue. 
     In order to structure the process of developing interview questions and link them to the 
theory, the working hypotheses method was very useful. Considering practicalities, I set-up an 
operationalization table where all the research questions are presented, along with the 
equivalent working hypothesis. These hypotheses have been classified under broad categories, 
with a number of sub-hypotheses.     
3.3.1 The selection of interviewees 
The selection of interviewees is vital. The selection of interviewees has proceeded in a similar 
mode as the development of research questions and hypotheses, namely developed in a 
explorative mode along the progress of the work. The interviewees have been asked to 
suggest additional relevant stakeholders and this has influenced the selection to a great extent. 
Since these stakeholders work regularly with the Strategy they have a vast network in the 
Baltic Sea Region, have knowledge of relevant stakeholders in the region that was taken 
advantage of in the interviewee selection. Another name for this kind of process is snowball 
effect gathering of interviews or chain referral sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981:141). 
Inspired by the information gathered from the conducted interviews the proceeding process 
and area of investigation will be decided. However, I have to avoid gathering too much 
information from a certain aspect of the leadership of the EUSBSR or a specific nationality 
and make sure that there will be at least a fairly well representation of different stakeholders. 
     The lower number of interviews the more important to consider this aspect, however, in 
this case eight interviews have been conducted. In addition, there is always the aspect of who 
answers the email or not that influence the final number and positions ofinterviewees. Since 
this thesis is developed in the explorative research tradition the aim is to conduct as many 
interviews as possible to get a wide range of perspectives on the issue. 
     When referring to the Commission it should be understood as the Commission as a whole 
but in practice it is the Directorate General for Regional Policy, and their officials, that 
conduct the everyday work and are the ones interviewed in this work.   
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3.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the methodological approach
A common critique of the interview method is that it is, by nature, subjective and describes a 
limited perspective of the whole range of viewpoints. The aim is and, cannot be, to tell a 
complete picture or truth about the Commissions leadership role in the EUSBSR but to give 
an account of 8 stakeholders’ perspective on the cooperation and Commission’s role. The 
strength of this method is that these accounts, naturally, never appear in the official 
documents so in that sense I have gathered information which is non-accessible in formal
documents. That opens up for new areas of studies and a possibility to cover new perspectives
of the area of study. Simply by the nature of the method, some of these perspectives cannot be 
supported by the official documents and in these cases they will simply represent one 
perspective by itself, completed by a theory.
To conclude, one might consider the selection of the analysis of the leadership role of the 
Commission in the EUSBSR daring since they themselves do not agree with this definition 
and a limited number of studies have been conducted on that specific topic. On the opposite, 
these factors have been challenging per se and the interviews are an invaluable source of 
information for discovering new angles of the leadership of the EUSBSR. 
Moreover, what will be apparent in the following chapters is the fact that the interviewees’ 
answers frequently differ. This will be considered as a finding by its own right; they represent 
different perspectives and thus understand and consider things differently. For instance, the 
representatives of the Commission answers points into the direction that they are not the 
leaders and are trying to hand over the responsibility to the real owners of the strategy: the 
Member States. The Swedish stakeholders, on the other hand, answer that they are satisfied 
with the present situation but have an understanding of the complexity of the issue. These 
perspectives underline the problem area itself, namely, the European Commission as the 
reluctant leader and placed in a leadership dilemma.     
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4. THE EUSBSR INITIATION AND LEADERSHIP STRUCTRE
In order to understand the complexities of EUSBSR leadership the formal structures will 
serve as a frame for understanding. That is the purpose of this chapter and in order to support 
the entire understanding of EUSBSR structures there are a number of pieces that need to be 
added. For instance, the process of the creation of EUSBSR will be presented in order to serve 
as a support for the later analysis of the Commission’s role within that process. 
      In other words, this chapter serve two purposes. On the one hand, it contains important 
information concerning the Strategy and its development in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the topic. On the other hand, it introduces the EUSBSR leadership 
structures that will be applied in the following chapters 
4.1 The Baltic Sea Region and the creation of the EUSBSR
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland became members of the EU in 2004 and then a 
completely new situation arose for the Baltic Sea Region cooperation. Now were the eight out 
of nine states bordering the Baltic Sea members of the EU and it was early on recognised,by 
the European Parliament,as an important opportunity (Swedish Government 2010:4). The 
EUSBSR origins stretches back to year 2005 when the idea of a common strategy for the BSR 
was introduced by the ‘Europe Baltic Group’ which was an informal group of seven MEPs 
(Beazley et al. 2005). The idea, although not initially met with a positive response by 
subsequent presidencies of the EU, Finland and Germany which showed no willingness of 
embracing the new initiative. Instead, it was Sweden who encouraged the Council to pursue 
the issue (Schymik and Krumrey 2009:5). Another perspective on how this process took 
place, according to Anders Lindholm, was that Sweden sold in the idea together with the 
European Parliament’s informal Baltic Group (Personal interview, 18 March 2013). This 
statement can only invite to a reflection on how these processes normally take place, however, 
what is important to bear in mind is that Sweden throughout the development, as well as 
implementation, occupied a central role.   
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     This process should be placed in a long tradition of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region 
where the development of EUSBSR was the most ambitious project for an overarching 
cooperation in the region. Ulf Savbäck pointed out that the Commission called the numerous 
and wide ranging Baltic Sea organizations for the “Baltic Soup” (Personal interview, 18 
March 2013) which also indicates the need to structure that cooperation.
      The drafting of the Strategy and the accompanying Action Plan was a process highlighted 
by the Commission and others (e.g. Shymik and Krumrey) as featuring a wide stakeholder 
process. The three principal components of the process were: non-papers from governments 
and other official bodies in the region, stakeholder events to allow NGOs and private 
participants to contribute and public consultations (Metzenger 2012:14). The public 
consultation process resulted in a considerable and substantial response - over one hundred 
written contributions - from Member States, non-Member States, regional and local 
authorities as well as from inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies (Metzenger 
2012:14). Although, this indicates a solid effort of including all the relevant stakeholders in 
the Baltic Sea Region, the consultation process should not be assessed based only on the 
number of contributions and proposals that were received. The process in itself and the 
Commission’s leadership role and influence at this time are relevant aspects for a full 
examination. This will be considered in the next chapter.   
4.1.1 The Action Plan
To begin with, it is important to point out that the Action Plan is a state official document 
guiding the practical work within the framework of EUSBSR and that these documents are 
regularly updated and reversed. The EUSBSR (the Strategy itself), on the other hand, is a 
political document endorsed by the European Council. 
The revision of the Action Plan was finalised in February 2013. A task force was established 
in June 2011 with the aim of setting-up roles and responsibilities of the EUSBSR stakeholders 
and to clarifying a concept of a flagship project of the EUSBSR; representatives of all the 
implementing stakeholder groups of the EUSBSR were invited. The work of the task force
resulted in the set of roles and responsibilities of the implementing stakeholders of the 
EUSBSR, the definition of the EUSBSR flagship project concept and the description of the 
labelling process of the EUSBSR flagship projects. The outcomes of the task force are 
reflected in the European Council Conclusions on the completion of the review of the 
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EUSBSR of 26 June 2012 (European Commission 2012) and the reviewed Action Plan of the 
EUSBSR of January 2013 (European Commission 2013). 
    According to Stocchiero, the Action Plan is the most important steering document, and is 
drafted mainly by national governments and the Commission, through a consultative process 
featuring various stakeholders (2010:6). This way, the formal decision-making procedure of 
the EUSBSR, is ultimately managed via the European Council, who is responsible for the 
major policy changes. 
4.2 The EUSBSR leadership structures
As an introduction to the governance structures, introduced with the Action Plan (European 
Commission 2013),BaibaLiepa from ‘Interact Point Turku’ was, during one and a half years,
part of the process drafting the tasks for the roles and responsibilities in the governance 
structures states that they were always referring to relevant actors. “There is no need to make 
a big party for the whole region; you should make a good party for concrete actors and 
persons who can make a change in the implementation of a particular area” (23 April 2013). 
So the possible contribution of each actor was guiding the work of setting up the roles and 
responsibilities. 
4.2.1 The structures – ‘the three no’s’
The important structural changeswithin the EUSBSR system is the incorporation of the so 
called ‘three no’s’. This approach aims at realizing the Strategy’s objectives without adding 
any new institutions, legislation or funding to the implementation of the EUSBSR; “instead it 
collects and highlights diverse and often already existing initiatives and instruments within a 
Baltic Sea Region framing, adding a macro-regional perspective” (Metzger 2012:265). These 
are highlightedwithin the governance framework assomething new for a macro-regional 
approach and ‘the three no’s’ is part of the EUSBSR framework and therefore something the 
stakeholders need to relate to. 
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      First, the no new institutions rule was motivated by the fact that various established 
institutions were already present in the Baltic Sea Region (Stoccchiero 2010:8). The no 
institutional rule offers a kind of contradiction in a sense that it has, in relation to EUSBSR, 
been pointed out that political space cannot operate without institutions. In this way, the no 
new institutions idea presented by the Commission is a contradiction in itself. Instead,
EUSBSR governance is arranged around an institutional structure composed of a type of 
multi-level governance structure (Stocchiero 2010:8). The task of the main stakeholders 
within this structure will be presented in a later section. According to Metzger and Schmitt, it 
can be “questioned if this governance framework can handle the massive exchange of 
information envisioned in the description of the proposed structure for coordination of it,     
Finally, it is interesting to note that both the process of development as well as the actual 
Strategy document put the Commission, although indirectly, in a central position in the 
singularized Baltic Sea Region,even though, officials from DG Regio have repeatedly 
attempted to downplay this emerging central role (Metzeger and Schmitt 2012:272). 
    Sooner or later, according to Metzeger and Schmitt, demands will arise for more extensive 
formal institutional structures for the EUSBSR (2012:274). The revision of the Action Plan 
with the formalization of the roles and responsibilities, as previously described, is one 
example of suchinstitutionalization.  
“Even though we said from the beginning that it should not be institutionalized I have to admit that there is no 
way of making it more official without this structure. I think we need to have some leadership in the area 
supported in the area, I don’t know how to make. We have to make it operational in the hands of the Member 
States” (Personal interview, 4 April 2013).
Moreover, I will return to a quest for a more formalized leadership from the Commission.
A number of stakeholders called for an own budget line for the Strategy in the consultation 
process, as did the Parliament earlier on, but “the Commission (and others) remains distinctly 
negative to the idea. Such a position was probably necessary in order to get the Strategy 
adopted by the European Council, but it nonetheless creates a problem that the Commission 
has no designated funding for its coordination efforts” (Bengtsson 2009:6). The effective
reduction of any major obstacle to the adoption of the strategy may lead to complications for 
the continuity of the work of the Commission. Anofficial from Baltic Sea Region points out 
that the Commission received technical assistance money as a gift from the European 
Parliament that was distributed to the Horizontal Action Leaders, Priority Area Coordinators 
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and paying for the Annual Forum and the communication. However, now you have more 
macro-regional strategies so the Commissiondo not know if we will get the money once more 
(Personal interview, 2 May 2013). Dedicating a fraction of EU resources for a limited part of 
the EU is still a sensitive issue. In the endorsement as well as in the implementation of the 
Strategy, it is good to avoid being accused of taking money for the Baltic Sea Region on 
behalf of other parts of EU. Nevertheless the issue of lack of financing of the Commission’s 
activities remains. 
4.2.2 The Commission’s leadership tasks
The first level is formed by the Commission as the overall coordinator and facilitator of the 
Strategy. At the second level the Commission elaborates upon the strategy together with the 
National Contact Points under the Prime or Foreign Affairs Ministries in the Member States. 
The third level is made out of the Priority Area Coordinators, which are typically central 
administrations or rarely regions or intergovernmental bodies. At the fourth level, the flagship 
projects with their Flagship Project Leaders (in general, various agencies and institutions in 
the region) are the main implementers of the Strategy (Stocchiero 2010:8). 
      The tasks of the Commission include: Playing a leading role in strategic coordination of 
the key delivery stages of the EUSBSR;Taking the EUSBSR into account in relevant policy 
initiatives and program planning;Promoting and facilitating the involvement of stakeholders 
from all levels of the entire macro-region and supporting them implement the EUSBSR; 
Encouraging dialogue and cooperation with stakeholders from other interested Baltic Sea 
Region states; Facilitating implementation of the EUSBSR in cooperation with the Member 
States Consulting on a regular basis with the Member States, inter alia through the High-Level 
Group; Evaluating and reporting on the progress made in implementing the EUSBSR and the 
results achieved (European Commission 2013).
The Commission, via its DG for Regional Policy, is in addition responsible for large parts of 
the communication about the Strategy where the operation of the targeted website and regular 
newsletters are included. Moreover, they organize an Annual Forum where they present the 
Strategy and its progress to the stakeholders of the EUSBSR.The input from this forum 
should also be incorporated within the Commission’s annual reporting on the implementation 
process of the Strategy (European Commission 2011). 
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4.2.3 The High Level Group 
The High Level Group (HLG) consists of senior civil servants from each EU Member State 
and, thus, binds together the EUSBSR EU level with the Member State level. It was formed as 
an advisory group for the Commission during the implementation of the EUSBSR; however, 
they also provide opinions on the review and updates of the EUSBSR and Action Plan and 
propose actions for the Commission as well as the Member States to strengthen the EUSBSR 
implementation (European Commission 2013). The meetings of the High Level Group are 
organizedon a regularly, basis according to need, but at least twice per year and consults with 
the Commission on the developments of the Strategy. Even though the HLG advise the 
Commission on the implementation process, providing key steering debates and EU wide 
anchorage of the Strategy it is more a kind of national representation body than a leading 
body (Personal interview, 4 April 2013). This has implications for implementation of the 
EUSBSR and there will be given accounts to various voices suggesting a strengthening of this 
group. From the Commission perspective the leading of this body is an issue; they wants 
another leading structure. A DG Regio official gives an account of a High Level Group as 
central in the leadership role, even though he states that the Commission are not happy about 
taking a central lead (15 March 2013). This responsibility is part of the things that the 
Commission wants to change in terms of its roles within the EUSBSR.  
4.2.4 The responsibilities of the Member States
At the Baltic Sea Regional level, National Contact Points (NCPs) have been appointed by the 
participating Member States, to assist in the national implementation of the Strategy 
(European Commission 2011).
The responsibilities of the Member States includes: Ensuring that the EUSBSR is 
implemented and has continuous political commitment to it; intensifying actions further to 
extend the existing political support for the implementation of the EUSBSR at all levels; 
Ensuring that national and regional strategic planning, existing policies, program and financial 
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instruments is in line with the EUSBSR by: coordinating and integrating relevant policies 
with the EUSBSR (European Commission 2013). 
      This brief account of the responsibilities the stakeholders have agreed to fulfil serve as an 
introduction to the discussion of leadership in the EUSBSR.
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5. THE COMMISSION’S LEADERSHIP ROLES
In this chapter the leadership roles of the Commission will be analyzed with the help of 
leadership theory and the concept of a institutional entrepreneur will be applied. The first 
research question will analyzed by considering a number of aspects of the Commission’s 
leadership roles. 
5.1 An Institutional entrepreneur in the development of EUSBSR
The Commission got the mandate from the European Council to develop the first macro-
regional strategy. “At that point the Commission had two options: to make a halfhearted 
consultation or take it seriously and try to make a good consultation process and to produce a 
real working strategy. The Commission choose the second option under the influence of  the 
Commissioner DanutaHubner where they took it seriously, a task force was created and the 
rest is sort of history” (Personal interview, 15 March 2013). They were credited for their work 
and were fulfilling a role that was needed within this process. That task force was set up by 
Colin Wolfe, the head of Unit, DG Regio. He was the one charged to make the whole process 
work and he set up a small and efficient team of his own staff. After this followed, according 
to a member of this team, “months of very intense work from October 2008 until June 2009 
the group had extremely hard work and pressure but I was also fulfilling actually because the 
group was getting a lot of work done and a lot of support for what they did” (Personal 
interview, 15 March 2013). In other words, in the process drafting the first version of the 
Baltic Sea Strategy the Commission took its job very seriously, the team at the DG Regio 
worked as an imposing force which was, obviously, appreciated by the stakeholders which 
praised them for the work. Anders Lindholm, national expert at DG Regio, gives an account 
of a very listening process were six major conferences and a number of other meetings were 
conducted where the stakeholders’ perspectives and points of view were gathered. In addition, 
DG Regio tried to negotiate directly with the Member States and seeking concrete agreeable 
proposals and they managed to collect it all in a very open process. Finally, Lindholm 
describes a very intense internal process at the Commission where 19 Directorate Generals 
looked at the different texts and gave the records on the Strategy and made suggestions for 
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changes (Personal interview, 18 March 2013). This inclusive process appeared to be guided 
by an ambition to be as non-imposing as possible towards the stakeholders. It was built on the 
existing conditions of the Baltic Sea Region with the aim of coordinating and facilitating the 
dialogue between the present multilevel organizations already in place in the region (Dubois 
et al 2009:32).  
         Through adopting the EU strategy, these countries are indeed committing themselves to 
increased attention to the problems and prospects of the Baltic Sea but, Bengtsson states that, 
“there remains an uneasy question about why the very same countries have not pursued the 
division of labour problem already in the past. The Baltic Sea Region thus seems to confirm 
the general picture in international relations that it is much easier to set up institutions than to 
get them working properly” (2009:6). That is a relevant comment that needs further attention,
however, here it is brought to give a perspective on the development of the Strategy. Simply 
because the process of setting up the Strategy was successful this, do not necessarily, say 
something about the efficiency of the Strategy within the implementation phase.    
5.1.1 The institutional entrepreneur 
      The role of the Commission in the processs of development of the macro-regional 
EUSBSR can be analysed by the help of the concept of Institutional Entrepreneurs. Even 
though the EUSBSR is not a question of institutional reform but simply the development of a 
strategy which would serve as a cooperative framework in the Baltic Sea Region, the concept 
of institutional entrepreneur is applicable. According to Schinkler (2001) account, 
institutional change often highlight the role of “entrepreneurs”. In times of institutional reform 
mobilization often creates collective action problem where well-situated actors may play the 
crucial role of framing the agreeable proposals. These actors are often regarded as neutral 
ones. The well-situated actor DG Regio performed what perhaps could be labeled as a major 
feat of “shuttle diplomacy”, consulting and coordinating various DGs, nation states, 
multinational and transnational organizations, NGOs and regional authorities (Metzger 
2010:14). DG Regio conducted an satisfactory work but, adding another level to the 
argumentation, could it be that from Commission’s perspective they simply prepared it 
because they had to do it? According to a DG Regio representative, participating in this 
process, for the Commission “it was an easier task to conduct at macro-regional level 
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gathering all the inputs and to prepare the strategy. Apart from that the Member States are the 
responsible ones; they wanted a strategy, they have it and they have to implement it” 
(Personal interview, 2 May 2013). 
Schinkler (2001) argues that the multiple interests’ stakeholders need entrepreneurial action to 
craft solutions and make them work together in pursuit of them. The interviewees pointed out 
that the Commission was the only actor being able to cope with that role becuase all the others 
were seen as representing specific interests. Padgett and Ansell (2003) argue that the most 
important factor is the access to multiple social networks. In the construction of agreeable 
solutions of the EUSBSR a success factor for finding the agreeable solutions was the access to 
these actors. Its position in itself is suitable strategically placed with a high level of access to 
the Member States and the stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Region. 
5.1.2 A Mediator? 
Then in what way did the Commission role differed from that of a mediator? Here the role of 
the mediator is brought up with the aim of examining if it fits into the institutional 
entrepreneurrole or not. Thispossible role is highlighted since it brings light on the room for 
manoeuvre the Commission upholds in the process. Even though the stakeholders gave an 
account of a neutral and trustworthy Commission it does not mean that they have their own 
agenda or at least have an interest in setting up a strategy that is close to their preferences on 
what a workable and efficient strategy looks like. The role of the institutional entrepreneur is 
freer that the mediator in a way that they are under no obligation to act in a manner that will 
seem impartial to all the principals. Young develop further the difference between these types 
of actors (2001:295):
“Unlike mediators, they are typically agents of actors that possess stakes in the issues at hand and participate in 
the relevant negotiations in their own right…Equally important, entrepreneurial leaders do not limit themselves 
to efforts to assist or facilitate negotiations among the principals. They work to frame the issues at stake and 
intervene energetically in the substance of the negotiations, endeavoring to invent attractive options and to 
persuade the parties to back the options they espouse. It follows that entrepreneurial leaders are not bound by a 
number of restrictions that constrain the efforts of mediators or other third parties”. 
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Applying this aspect to the Commission’s role in the negotiations is interesting because it 
sheds light on the freedom of the position in the drafting process. In practice there may have 
been a different reality but the position itself is quite open. However, Anders Lindholm states 
that in the drafting of the EUSBSR it was especially influenced by the Commission, they 
gathered all the perspectives of stakeholders but it was only when something considered being 
very controversial they would react and propose a change of the actual text (Personal 
interview, 18 March 2013). By its own nature it is a complex process to influence, especially 
since there were a vast number of stakeholders involved and that fact puts the Commission in 
a more advantageous position. According to Ulf Savbäck, that role of the Commission was 
definitely visible and gives an account of a process where the stakeholders responded to a 
number of questions from the Commission rather than questioning the content per se. As a 
continuation, when the Commission came out with their draft, after the consultations, it was
almost impossible, in a multilateral process, to fully challenge such a strategy (Personal 
interview, 18 March 2013). The aim is certainly not to prove if the Commission had their own 
agenda – rather the opposite – but indicate the flexible and advantageous position of the 
Commission, on opposite to the limited room for maneuver of a mediator.   
5.2 The unusual and powerful role of the Commission
Considering the EUSBSR development process above reveals that the methodology in the 
making of the EUSBSR was at this time actually rather unusual in the context of EU 
territorial policy. As Haughton et al note, contemporary transnational regional projects in 
Europe have previously been primarily the sole business of small groups of experts and civil 
servants, and the resulting strategies and visions have primarily reflected the consensus 
reached within these restricted policy circles and did not have very much input outside of 
them. The open consultations, developed in the EUSBSR process, involving all the 
stakeholders in the region aiming at tying together already existing interests, initiatives and 
projects was something new that placed the Commission at a central position (2010:20). 
That is obviously a relevant comment that brings me to how the Commission is regarded 
considering neutrality. Anders Lindholm (Personal interview, 18 March 2013) gives an 
account of a trustworthy, neutral Commission with confidenceanddiscretion. As a 
continuation, the stakeholders:  “do not examine the Commission with some kind 
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ofimmediateskepticism(what are they up tonow?), only whenitbecomescontroversial content-
vise playersreact and oppose the Commissionproposal.” This account of a Commission’s role 
can be preferable related to an account (Underdal 1994:183) of a kind of conditional 
leadership:  
“A leader does not supply leadership in the abstract but provides a particular "product"-a particular set of 
services designed to achieve some particular purpose. Similarly, followers do not demand, and will not subject 
themselves to, any kind of leadership; they are prepared to let themselves be led only in a particular direction and 
perhaps only in a certain fashion”. 
The European Commission is in a powerful position where they together with top-level 
officials in the Member States can act as the ultimate arbiters of which issues should be 
proposed to be included in the Strategy and which not, which voices to listen to in the process 
and which not, and, further, which actors responsibilities of implementation should be 
delegated to and which not.Yet, the ‘day-to-day’ decision-making of the EUSBSR is handled 
mostly between the Commission and the Member States (via the High Level Group), albeit in 
collaboration with other relevant actors via the stakeholder process outlined above. All, in all 
it is however the Commission staff, via DG Regio, that finally drafts the strategic document 
and decides what stakeholder input to include (Stocchiero 2010:6). Therefore it is relevant to 
take a closer look at that emerging role of the Commission and how it appeared. 
It is interesting to note that both the process of development as well as the actual Strategy 
document put forward by the Commission, although indirectly, in a central position in the 
singularized Baltic Sea Region. Even though officials from DG Regio have repeatedly 
attempted to downplay this emerging central role, according to Metzeger and Schmitt, the 
Commission inevitable becomes positioned as a claimant to the status of legitimate regional 
spokesperson with the right to define the interests and essence of the Baltic Sea Region 
(2012:272).Here, the reason behind this emerging role of the Commission was referred to as
the singularized Baltic Sea Region where they were the natural emerging regional 
spokesperson. Additionally, stakeholders’accounts of the Commission as the natural, 
trustworthy leader placed in a strategic position to uphold that functions. There is an 
additional aspect that puts the Commission in its influential position, namely, the facilitation 
and holding in place and protection of the singularized version of the Baltic Sea region in the 
EUSBSR. In that sense the Commission secures that it does not again break up into multiple, 
perhaps conflicting, articulations (Metzger and Schmitt 2012:275). All these accounts 
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indicates a powerful role of the Commission within the European Union Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region. 
5.2.1 Policy dialogue 
Regarding the role of the European Commission, at this stage in the process, it was an unusual 
one because here they were working in a policy dialog and not just following up the treaties. 
Working directly with the stakeholders as the coordinatormeans that “the Commission will 
work with a whole array of governmental and non-governmental actors, in effect occupying a 
potentially very influential position” (Bengtsson 2009:5). That’s no doubt a powerful role 
acting as the central actor gathering all the comments in the development of the strategy. On 
the other hand, they were given the mandate by the European Council to perform this task no 
matter what they thought about the work itself. Nevertheless it is interesting to consider the 
opinion of the Commission performing this task. Ulf Savbäck (Personal interview, 18 March 
2013) gives an account of civil servants at DG Regio which enjoyed this free policy 
development work much more than the regular monitoring of the treaty texts. As a 
continuation, I asked Ulf Savbäck if this was a problematic role that the Commission was 
occupying and he answered that he was far too much into the work that it was difficult to 
regard it from the outside. 
5.3 Commission’s role in the EUSBSR implementation
The Commission has been identified as an entrepreneurial leader in the process of 
development of the Strategy which the previous application very much indicates; 
nevertheless, the implementation phase is a different story. The central area of study is the 
role in the development of the Strategy and, therefore, Commission’s role in the 
implementation will only briefly be analyzed. 
Nevertheless, in the implementation they are upholding a relevant role but it is rather complex 
to identify and label that role of the Commission. Underdal states that instrumental leadership 
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(labeled entrepreneurial leader by Young 1991) “seems to be based on three capabilities: 
skill, energy, and status. At least skill and energy may for all practical purposes be considered 
necessary conditions for success” (1994:188).Snidal (1990: 345) talks, for example, about the 
need of "conjunction of resources and initiative”. These factors may be applied to the 
discussion in the role of the Commission in the implementation phase. As presented 
previously the stakeholders have given an account of skills and status of the Commission in 
the process of drafting the EUSBSR, however, the aspect of energy, in other words resources, 
may be lacking in the implementation. Snidal’s (1990: 345) "conjunction of resources and 
initiative” may direct us in an interesting direction in line with the accounts of the interviewed 
representatives at DG Regio. There will be given an account of only three people working at 
the Baltic Team at the DG Region and this, nevertheless, indicates a lack of resources to 
manage a Strategy. 
The shift from the development phase to the implementation phase implied a new leadership 
role of the European Commission.A DG Regio official had another perspective on the 
expected role of the European Commission within the implementation phase.The expectations 
of the future role of the Commission was initially conceived of as a consultant work, where 
DG Regio would step in and assume responsibility for running the process and drafting the 
Strategy but then step back and leave full responsibility for the application of the Strategy to 
the involved stakeholders and project owners. However, in the end it didn’t work like that, 
from every level they were expected to stay involved (Personal interview, 15 March 2013)
and the Commission turned out to be something more than simply consultants with a greater 
responsibility and influence. Even though officials from DG Regio have repeatedly attempted 
to downplay this emerging central role (Personal interview, 15 March 2013) the Commission 
has become the instigators and `owners' of the strategy, the EU inevitably becomes positioned 
as a claimant to the status of legitimate regional spokesperson with the right to define the 
interests and essence of the Baltic Sea Region (Metzger and Schmidt 2011:272). 
As a response to the implementation complications the Commission has, to some degree, 
“retreated from the more dogmatic distributed network implementation model that was 
initially envisaged for the Strategy and, instead, proposed a framework for the coordination of 
efforts towards the further development and implementation of the Strategy” (Metzger and 
Schmitt 2012:273). The newly revized Action Plan (European Commission 2013) indicates 
these changes in the implementation model.
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6. THE HANDLING OF COMMISSION’S LEADERSHIP ROLE
In order to answer the question on how the Commission consider and handle its leadership 
role in the EUSBSR there are a number of relevant factors to consider. The leadership 
dilemma and the requests for limited responsibilities are important parts in the EUSBSR 
leadership puzzle where the ‘path dependency’ theory is an analytical tool for understanding 
of the lack of flexibility within the system. 
6.1EUSBSR leadership issues
There appears to be a misfit between the expectations of the Member States and the
Commission own view on their role and responsibilities within the EUSBSR. Formally, each 
stakeholder’s responsibilities are clearly regulated in the governance structure of the Action 
Plan but in practice there seems to be a misfit. The Commission tends to refer to the formally 
stated responsibilities while, in practice, when an actor does not fulfill its responsibilities, this 
needs to be done by someone else.
6.1.1 The reluctant leader? 
According to a DG Regio official,“the High Level Group is central in the leadership role, 
even though the Commission is not happy about taking a central lead….in my view the 
Commission is actually trying to relinquish their role in the strategy, apart from the 
coordination of the Strategy in relation to specific policies. We are satisfied with that role and 
would rather see a much wider body leading the Strategy” (Personal interview, 15 March 
2013). When asking Anders Lindholm, a former national expert at DG Regio, about the 
reluctant leadership of the Commission I got the answer:
“Yes, I think that’s correct. It was never an end in itself for the Commission to have a leading role in the 
strategy. You want to achieve the results, get enhanced efficiency and be able to point out a success in this area 
but never reached for a leadership role as you do in other areas”(Personal interview, 29 April 2013).
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This perspective indicates that the results and efficiency of the Strategy is central for the 
Commission but not to lead a strategy. In that sense they may have been ready to take on 
greater responsibility when there was such a need for the purpose of the success of the 
Strategy. According to a DG Regio representative, the Commission is trying to relinquish 
their role in the strategy, apart from the coordination of the Strategy in relation to specific 
policies. “We are satisfied with that role and would rather see a much wider body leading the 
strategy” (Personal interview, 15 March 2013). This account of the European Commission as 
the reluctant leader of the EUSBSR should serve as an introduction to the following 
presentation of leadership dilemmas at place in the EUSBSR. 
6.1.2 The EUSBSR leadership dilemma I: Commission is not the leader!
When asking the interviewees about the role of the Commission, a significant number of them 
answered that the Commission is not the leader of the EUSBSR, but the coordinator or 
facilitator (Personal interviews, 15 March 2013; 3 April 2013; 4 April 2013; 23 April 2013; 3 
May 2013). Here it is relevant to stop and reflect on their perspectives. To begin with, the 
majority of these interviewees are Commission officials. Moreover in direct relation to their 
accounts of Commission’s responsibilities, they refer to the responsibilities of the Member 
States. These actors are the owners of the Strategy so they should be the leaders and finally 
when the Member States do not do their job, the Commission needs to step in and cover up. A 
stakeholder working closely with the Strategy for a number of years states that: 
“the Commission is not the coordinator, they are the facilitator. The Horizontal Action Leaders and the National 
Contact Point are the leaders so this is the first answer. Secondly, the High Level Group is an advisory group, the 
last level for decision-making, is so much more than the status provides for today. The Commission always wait 
for them we always wait from them, in a decision, and when they say it’s ok, the Commission say it’s 
ok”(Personal interview, 2 May 2013). 
Even though the roles and responsibilities of all the actors are clarified in the Action Plan 
(European Commission 2013), this account serves as an insight into the complex, multi-level, 
governance structure of the EUSBSR. Returning to the role of the Commission within the 
Baltic Sea Strategy: “If the Commission took more tasks, and where more active that was 
because there was someone who (read, member states) did not do their jobs properly” 
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(Personal interview, 2 May 2013). This account opens up for one role in theory and another in 
practice, when the stakeholders do not fulfill their assigned tasks. This, however, does not
change the position that the Commission does not wish to take on further leadership.
      There is no time to manage the Strategy when “the Baltic team has two national experts 
and one official, Joanna Kiryllo work part time, Jean-Marc Venineaux work part time and 
there is one trainee. Three people cannot manage a strategy so the role is only to facilitate. 
The ‘Interact Point Turku’ is very good so they should be mentioned, without them we 
couldn’t do all the things they do, they really deserve the appreciation”(Personal interview, 2 
May 2013). The aspect of resources and personnelare central.According to that same
stakeholder, it would noteven be possible for them to manage a strategy with that limited 
amount of personnel. In other words, we are not the leaders and you can see that we do not
even have the personnel to lead the strategy; adding a very practical aspect to the discussion. 
    The last part of this puzzle concerns the legal framework. As part of ‘the three no’s’ inthe 
EUSBSR isno new legislation. The Strategy is placed within the existing legal framework and 
the Strategy itself is not legally binding. This adds another level to the role of the Commission 
within the Strategy. A stakeholder working with the Strategy for many years gives an account 
of the implications of a lack of legal basis for the cooperation referring to a situation in the 
last revision of the Action Plan where there were two Member States fighting in this process. 
In such a situation the Commission:
“do not even have a legal basis to say - ok, you don’t agree then the Commission decides that it will be like this 
because the Commission isn’t the boss. Then because it was ongoing it will be anyway a communication and this 
is a Commission document so then we decide what we put in the communication document. So had to go this 
way, because everybody said when EC don’t decide it will be the High Level Group which decide and there you 
have the same people fighting…Even communication is not a regulation or a directive, it’s for information. We 
can encourage we can say if it’s good or bad but we don’t have any legal basis to force anybody. If it would have 
been a regulation it would have been different then you don’t have to write communications. It’s nice, but…”
(Personal interview, 2 May 2013)
Without the legally binding framework at place, the instruments at hand in such a situation are 
few. One may say that it is really up to them to solve these issues. They wanted the Strategy,
they have the Strategy and now it is up to them to implement it. The question that remains 
unanswered is: who should clear up a complex situation like the one previously described? In 
the end, someone has to do it and the Commission gave an account of a one way, however not 
optimal, to cope with such a situation. However, to solve an issue without the accurate tools at 
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hand is in the end also a kind of way of managing the cooperation. When the Member States
cannot solve their own problems it comes back to the Commission. Here the Commission 
serves as something that could be described as a kind of lender of last resort.  With these 
words, I conclude this section and turn the focus towards the role the Commission would like 
to play instead. As a continuation, according to the Commission: “we can monitor because we 
are outsiders in some way, we can prepare documents for the European Council to endorse 
and thinks like that…but not be the leaders” (Personal interview, 2 May 2013). Maybe just 
because they are outsiders, they can deal with complicated situations, such as the conflict 
between Member States. 
6.1.3 The EUSBSR leadership dilemma II: Commission wants to have less responsibility!
Reading about the leadership structure of the EUSBSR a picture of a kind of leadership 
dilemma becomes clear. The Commission wants to pass over some of their responsibilities (or 
simply does not wants to cover up for the Member States’ tasks) to the Members States - the 
actual owners of the Strategy – while there is a limited interest from the Member States to 
take a greater responsibility in the leading of the Strategy So far the Commission has not 
succeeded, it has not been possible. The format for a new governance structure is unclear and 
a general lack of interest, from the stakeholders, for such a role. 
On the opposite, the sooner the EUSBSR can prove clear and good results the sooneryou will 
have Member States ready to claim the role,and consequently, the sooner the leadership 
structure will be solved. Then naturally someMember States would be happy to say that the 
success was thanks to them, however, how to relate the results to a specific Strategy when 
there are so many external factors at play. A DG Regio official (Personal interview, 4 April 
2013) explains the complex situation in the following way: “the leadership is needed 
otherwise it will not change anything at the same time the leadership will be claimed once the 
results are good. This is the dilemma.”
     The link between results and a strong leadership is clear. In the EUSBSR there is a need 
for a strong leadership however it is an unsolved issue. At the first place, the Strategy was 
requested by the European Council and by Member States in the region and, secondly, 
developed by European Commission. The Member States are the owners the Strategy, 
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nevertheless, the ownership or leadership is still a big issue. When I asked a DG Regio 
official about the division of responsibilities I got the following answer: 
“We have been the institution trying to keep the momentum in the Strategy but now we think that it’s their time 
to take over this role and responsibility. I am not saying that we have been the leaders but we have tried to keep 
it alive, it’s not dying. We would be happy is the Member States would be able to take over some of the roles of 
steering and leading” (Personal interview, 4 April 2013).
A possible reason for today’s leadership complexities is that the Member States did not 
realize the actual responsibilities related to the adoption of the EUSBSR. It was in many ways 
a very ambitious macro-regional strategy and since it was the first strategy of this kind there 
may have been a lack of understanding of what they assigned themselves to do. On the other 
hand, the Commission may argue that a leadership discussion would not even exist if the 
Member States would have understood their role at the first place. BaibaLiepa, Interact Point 
Turku, gives an account of frequent requests from the Member States to the Commission to 
take the lead of the Strategy and she finds this interesting because from the beginning it is the 
Member States’ Strategy, they approved the Strategy and the Commission was just supporting 
the process. In that sense, she continues, it is quite clear that it should be the Member States 
who should take over but if they would have understood their responsibilities at the first place 
there would not be a need to hand it over, the Member States should be leading the Strategy 
by now (Personal interview, 22 April 2013).In that sense the requests from the Member 
States, in itself,indicate that there is a gap between the understanding of responsibilities and in
this positions the Commission tries to reduce its leadership responsibilities. This position 
must be frustrating for the Commission since they have ended up in an unexpectedposition 
and a leadership dilemma which may be complicated to leave.
However, discussions on how to solve this complex situation takes place continuously. For 
instance, Erik Kiesow gives an account of various suggestions for leadership solutions where 
the most absurd one implied the nomination of a kind of President of the Baltic Sea Region 
where Lech Walesa, for instance, was mentioned(Personal interview, 30 April 2013). That 
propositionmay be a quite unrealistic solution to the leadership problem in the region, 
however, more realistic suggestions has also been put forward as, for instance, the rotating 
Presidency of the Baltic Sea Region. A stakeholder, involved in the Strategy for many years, 
states that in a recent meeting it was suggested that there should be a rotating Presidency of 
the EUSBSR with each Member State taking the full responsibility for half a year. As a 
continuation, she states that the first reaction was really negative and that it is problematic that 
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really nobody wanted to be fully responsible for the EUSBSR even for half a year (Personal 
interview, 2 May 2013). Even though the first reactions of the Member States were
negative,and their standpoints may change over time, it gives an indication of the hesitant 
approach towards leadership responsibilities and, consequently, the Commission’s difficulties 
in reducing its leadership responsibilities. Despite the fact that today, when a Member State 
from the Baltic Sea Region upholds the EU Presidency, it becomes a natural leadership of the 
EUSBSRparallel to their preparations(Personal interview, 30 April 2013). Nevertheless, it 
was still a lack of interests from the Member States to take on greater leadership 
responsibilities in a kind of EUSBSR Presidency. That was understood as something 
problematic and adds another layer to the possibilities of the Commission to pass over their 
present responsibilities. 
6.2 The path dependent leadership role of the Commission
In the first Action Plan for the EUSBSR there were a lack of clear role divisions for the 
stakeholders, nevertheless, quite early in the process it became obvious that there was a need 
of the Commission to take greater responsibility for the lead of the strategy. Previously I have 
given an account of a Commission which wanted to act as a McKinsey consultant when 
setting up the Strategy and then passing over the lead of the Strategy to the stakeholders 
(Personal interview, 15 March 2013), however, it did not come as a surprise that the 
Commission was expected to take a lead in the coordination of the strategy. Though, 
“howextensivethat rolewouldbehas always been a subject ofnegotiation.It is nota question 
being solved once and for allbut rather an ongoing process where the Commission wants to 
pass over responsibility on the Member States while these want the Commission to keep 
staying involved” (Personal interview, 29 March 2013). Nevertheless, applying the path 
dependency theoretical framework to that discussion implies that even though it is a 
continuous issue of negotiations the Commission will face difficulties leaving its present 
responsibilties. In a path dependent process, the probability of further steps along the same 
path increases with each move down that path; to put it a different way, the costs of exit of 
switching to some previously plausible alternative-rise (Pierson 2000:252). In that sense, the 
longer the Commission upholds its leadership role in the EUSBSR the more difficult it would 
be to switch to another leadership structure. In other words, that continuous discussion as 
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referred to (Personal interview, 29 March 2013) will not necessarily lead to a favorable 
solution for the Commission, especially not over the passage of time.  
     In the revision of the Action Plan, finalized in 2013, the responsibilities got formalized and 
may therefore have put an end to the continuing discussions on the responsibilities of the 
Commission. On the other hand, the Commission is nevertheless trying to escape this 
formalized responsibility. In relation to this, they may have encountered problems in line with 
“the critical feature of path-dependent processes is the relative ”openness” or 
”permissiveness” of early stages in a sequence compared with relatively “closed” or 
“coercive” nature of later stages” (Mahoney 2003; Abott 1997). Meaning that it may have 
been easier to leave its responsibility at an earlier point in time and the reactions came 
accordingly.The metaphor of “openness” and “closed” nature of the processes indicates the 
difficulties of the Commission to “escape” its role at the later stages in the process. In that 
sense, the development phase of the EUSBSR is characterized by more openness while, the 
second phase, the implementation of the EUSBSR,is more closed in its nature.Accordingly, 
the longer time it takes for the Commission to find a new leadership solution, the more 
difficult it will be for them to leave that role. 
      Naming this section the path dependent leadership of the Commission refers to a 
leadership they can’t escape. The institutional setting of the Strategy was in a kind of vacuum 
and therefore in a need, already since the beginning, of the Commission to take a leadership 
role within the EUSBSR. Now, in the revision of the Action Plan, for the first time the 
responsibilities where clearly defined and having already started walking down the “path” of 
the EUSBSR, with all the structures in place, it may be far too late for the Commission to 
think that they can leave this responsibility easily. One way of succeeding to diminish
Commission’s present tasks would be to limit its roles and responsibilities in the Action Plan 
(European Commission 2013), however,once the responsibilities would be omitted it does not 
necessarily  means that they would have a less responsibilities in practice. Especially since the
case it to opposite today, they have more responsibilities than what is regulated. Moreover,in 
line with the path dependency theoretical framework,a request for diminished leadership 
rolemay draw the attention and the stakeholders may act as a guarder of the EUSBSR and, 
consequently, the Commission can be “brought back” to its previously expected role. 
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6.2.1The aspect of time and path dependency
The aspect of time could be linked to leadership theory in the way that the leader is expected 
to point the direction for the future of the Strategy and the lack of such role could imply un-
clarities for the future development. In addition, as presented previously, time is a factor that, 
in line with the ‘path dependency’ theory, complicates vast structural changes along the 
passage of time. Since the DG Regio thinks that they have fulfilled their role and would like 
to pass over the coordination role, this might, in itself, influence the leadership and possible 
future solutions. Jean Marc Venineaux (Personal interview, 4 April 2013) pointed out that the 
sooner we can prove good results the faster we can find a structure or a stakeholder which is
ready to take over the lead. On the opposite, the longer it takes to prove good results the 
longer time it will take to find someone who would be ready to “stand up” for the Strategy 
and say: - look what we have done! This quote was worth repeating since it gives an insight in
one crucial point of the leadership complexities. On the other hand, the longer time the 
present Strategy and leadership structure is in place the more difficult it will be to leave the 
present responsibilities. 
      The aspect of time could also be linked to ‘path dependency’ in the way that the 
weaknesses in the institutional setting and problems to solve these could lead to a more 
inefficient Strategy and less support in itself.  Eric Kieslow (Personal interview, 22 March 
2013) pointed out that in the preparations for the Swedish Presidency and the adoption of the 
EUSBSR clear aims and targets as well as a dedicated budget was avoided in order to be sure 
that the European Council would adopt the strategy. Today, we may face the consequences of 
these decisions for a non-imposing Strategy in a way that the initial institutional setting, 
developed path dependently, is not easily changed and may be related to the complexities 
today.
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7. POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND PRESTIGE
The research question is: How does the Commission consider and handle its leadership role 
in the EUSBSR? In order to answer that question there are a number of factors at play. The 
political prestige of the Commission, as well as of the Member States, has, during the 
interviews, appeared as an important part of the EUSBSR leadership puzzle. The ‘path 
dependency’ theoretical framework will be applied. 
7.1 The political prestige of the Commission
An important aspect when considering the approach of the Commission towards the Strategy 
and the relevance of its success may be related to the amount of political prestige that they 
have invested in the strategy. When asking Erik Kiesowabout invested political prestige in the 
EUSBSRhe states:
“Oh, yes the Commission has passed beyond the point of no return. They themselves havebrought theforms 
ofmacro-regional strategiesin its legislative proposalsfor regulationsforstructural funds andinvestment funds,and 
that'shuge sums…so the EU has really invested political capital when they themselves has done part of the 
acquis so they won’t be able to back out” (Personal interview, 30 April 2013). 
That is an interesting account of the role of the Commission within the Strategy and adds 
another layer to the previous picture. The invested prestige in the EUSBSR may have made
them concerned about its success and therefore as well in arranging a functional replacement
solution. In other words, this indicates greater importance to find an effective solution proving 
results rather than an immediate solution for the Commission to pass over theirleadership 
responsibilities. It is of importance to stop and reflect on the meaning of Commission’s ‘point 
of no return’ as referred to previously. Generally understood, the ‘point of no return’ is the 
point beyond which one must continue on his or her current course of action because turning 
back is, in some sense, physically impossible;a particular irreversible action. A definition is “a 
point at which an irreversible commitment must be made to an action, progression, etc.” or “a 
point in a journey at which, if one continues, supplies will be insufficient for a return to the 
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starting place” (Collins Dictionary, retrieved 21 May 2013). Interestingly, the definition lies 
close to the understanding of the ‘path dependency’ where walking down the selected path 
continuously complicates the return, while the defined concept refers to a certain point at that 
path when there is lack of supplies for a return to the starting place. 
    When asking Anders Lindholm about the present responsibilities of the Commission he 
states that the present responsibilities are at a decent level but that in the medium term they 
will want to diminish their role. On the other hand, he continues, DG Regio is sometimes 
questioned and considered as too technical but in EUSBSR they got to work directly with 
challenges and solutions in the region and are credited for their work so in this sense it gives 
political prestige (Personal interview, 29 March 2013). The positive feedback to their 
workindicates Commission’spolitical prestige within the EUSBSR, along with their political 
capital invested in the legislative framework for the macro-regional strategies. Finally, when 
the Commission has invested political prestige within the EUSBSR it goes hand in hand with 
requests for positive results of the Strategy. A DG Region official gives an account of the 
future of the EUSBSR stating that without aleadership solutionfor the EUSBSR there is a risk 
that nothing changes at all. In such a case there will be a delicate issue and a big risk of being 
criticized but it would also give the evidence that the Strategy is not very useful (Personal 
interview, 4 April 2013). That account indicates a quite complex, and prestigious, position of 
the Commission within the EUSBSR. 
7.2 The political prestige of the Member States
The Commission is, nevertheless, not the only one with political prestige invested in the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The Member States are dependent as well 
on a successful EUSBSR for a number of reasons. 
     To begin with, Sweden that held the Presidency during the adoption of the Strategy may be 
the Member State with most political capital invested in the Strategy. Erik Kiesow from the 
Swedish Cabinet Office, gives an account of a lengthy processwith many personsinvolved 
inthe development of the EUSBSR. Consequently, he states that it exista responsibility 
towardsthesepeoplein the region. Continuously, for that reason, the Strategy must be given a 
chance to be accomplished and it must be ensured thatthe adequate resourcesis in place in 
order topursue whatis undertaken in the EUSBSR (Personal interview, 22 March 2013). To be 
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responsible towards the Baltic Sea Region network indicates a prestige invested in the 
cooperation and a responsibility towards the stakeholders contributing to the development of 
the EUSBSR. 
     During the Presidencies of the Member States from the region there has been prestige 
invested in their work for adoption or revision of the EUSBSR and the Action Plan. A 
stakeholder involved in the EUSBSR for many years states that the Member States have 
invested political prestige in the EUSBSR, especially during their Presidencies. Continuously, 
political prestige from Sweden was invested during the adoption and from Poland during the 
revision process,as well as from Denmark. Finally, it is stated thatLithuania, Germany and 
Finland took a joint responsibility of the EUSBSR during their Presidency or within the CBSS 
so their political prestige is invested in the EUSBSR (Personal interview, 3 May 2013). At the 
first place there may be a kind of pressure from the region to select the EUSBSR as a 
prioritized issue, however, that cannot be investigated here. Secondly, once choosing the EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region as a prioritized area during the EU Presidency prestige is 
invested and there is a strive for results of their work. 
7.3 We cannot let it die; we have to solve the leadership issue
At this point, it may be suitable to connect the discussion of political prestige to institutional 
theory in order to gain a perspective on the present leadership issues within the EUSBSR. In a 
following section, this will be completed with ‘path dependency’ analysis. 
While the rational institutionalism  approaches focus mainly on what determines the choice of 
a particular  institution  and is expected to serve the interests of those who created  it; the  
institutional development theory supports the claim that a particular institution exists because 
it serves as an effective response to some kind of societal problem (Pierson 2004:104-5). The 
latter theoretical approach, namely, that an institution exists to solve mainly environmental,
but as well societal problem in the Baltic Sea Region, is the starting point for that analysis in 
this thesis. The vast number of soft-power Baltic Sea Region organizations at place previously 
in the region and the notion that EUSBSR was set up partly to serve as an overarching 
framework for these ones supports this standpoint. Moreover, the aim of the cooperation is 
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summarized in the introduction to theAction Plan for the European Union Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region opens by the words (European Commission 2013):
An integrated framework that allows the European Union and Member States to identify needs and match them 
to the available resources by coordinating of appropriate policies, thus enabling the Baltic Sea Region to 
achieve a sustainable environment and optimal economic and social development.
These words support the standpoint that EUSBSR is a cooperative framework that exists to 
meet the challenges of the region in an innovative way. Therefore – interestingly – EUSBSR 
has the right to exist as long as these societal problems are unsolved. It has the right to exist
independently even though it does not serve the interests of the Member States. In other 
words, independently of political prestige of the Member States and the Commission it has the 
right to exist. The real threat to the cooperation would rather be lack of efficiency in meeting 
the problems in the Baltic Sea Region. In that sense, a precondition for existence of EUSBSR 
is results and not necessarily satisfied stakeholders. The answers from the interviewees differ 
to a great extent on the question about the future of EUSBSR, however, Erik Kiesow stands 
out in a sense that he states that the EUSBSR have not, by its own right, the right to exist. 
Once the Strategy has fulfilled its aim it should cease to exist, however, not before the end of 
the next program period 2013-2020(Personal interview, 30 April 2013).
     According to the ‘path dependency’ theoretical framework the setting up of EUSBSR, in 
itself, initiated a process possibly difficult to reverse. In addition, the Member States and the 
Commission have continuously invested political prestige within the cooperation. Anders 
Lindholm gives an account of a Commission who would wait toresolve the leadership issue 
satisfactory before it withdraws from the present responsibilities. He continues stating that the 
Commission does not want to leave totally but uphold a minor role and transfer the greater 
responsibilities to, for instance, Interact Point Turku or Baltic Sea Program. There are 
different leadership possibilities that the Commission consider all the time (Personal 
interview, 18 March 2013). The lack of rush for a new leadership structure may indicate an 
interest in upholding good results in the EUSBSR, possibly related to the political prestige 
invested in the cooperation. The Member States have indicated a limited interest in taking a 
greater responsibility for the EUSBSR, however, due to the political prestige invested in the 
EUSBSR. In case of a serious threat to the cooperation, there may be a greater numbers of 
“volunteers” to save the EUSBSR. 
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7.4 Political commitment of the Member States
The political commitment is a crucial concept in the EUSBSR, maybe the most important and 
especially the lack of political commitment of certain actors according to the Commission
(European Commission 2012). A DG Regio official states that at the time of the adoption and 
in the beginning of the EUSBSR implementation very high level commitment was visible. 
Today it seems to be difficult to convince a specific minister to take EUSBSR action, 
however, there is a need to avoid the situations of a more verbal commitment then a real one
(Personal interview, 15 March 2013). 
  To maintain high-level political commitment the Strategies’ outcomes need to be clearer at 
both national and EU level. Strategy considerations should be reflected in budget and other 
discussions. Political commitment must be translated into administrative commitment, with 
sufficient staffing and a continuity of the personnel (European Commission 2012). These are 
examples of concrete solutions to the lack of political commitment of some EUSBSR Member 
States, however, it is also possible to limit the ambition of the cooperation. According to a DG 
Regio official it is crucial to make sure that the stakeholders are seriously committed and, if 
not, there may be a need of a serious discussion on how to change the Member States’ role to 
make it more fitting to their demands (Personal interview, 15 March 2013). The issue of 
political commitment appears central in the leadership dilemmas of the EUSBSR in the sense 
that when the Member States do not fulfill their obligations, the Commission needs to cover 
up for them.
    It is as well a question of the stakeholder’s approach towards the cooperation, in that sense, 
the implementation depends on the persons and institutions behind.In the implementation, 
BaibaLiepa gives an account of quite a lot of stakeholders waiting for the guidance from the 
European Commission, however, the Commission is not in a position to give guidanceis such 
practical issues (Personal interview, 23 April 2013). This account indicates another leadership 
dilemma at place in the EUSBSR where they are waiting for the “other” to conduct the 
implementation, or at least tell them what should be done. 
     As a conclusion, and an indication for the future of the governance and implementation of 
EUSBSR Bengtsson(2009:7) states that:
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“the Commission toolbox is worryingly empty – it remains a key challenge to make the visions of the strategy 
operational. In addition, questions remain as to how the Commission is to monitor implementation and assure the 
future direction of the strategy, for instance in a situation where the political priorities on the union’s agenda are 
different from today. For a number of reasons, then, governance of the strategy will be difficult in the format 
now chosen.”
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8. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the leadership role of the Commission in the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in terms of its implications and, 
consequently, how they consider and handle this role.
     The final chapter will sum up the findings and highlight how the theoretical framework 
was suitable for the analysis of theCommissions leadership role of a macro-regional strategy. 
Finally, I will suggest possible areas for further research of a leadership analysis of the 
EUSBSR. 
8.1The leadership role
This part of the analysis responded to the question of the Commission’s leadership role in the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. As shown in the analysis, there are a 
number and factors, of importance to bring up, in order to extensively cover the aspects of this 
role.
Considering the EUSBSR development process itreveals that the methodology in the making 
of the EUSBSR was at this time actually rather unusual in the context of EU which at that 
time primarily was the sole business of small groups of experts and civil servants and did not 
have very much input from the outside. The open consultations, involving all the stakeholders 
in the region aiming at tying together already existing interests, initiatives and projects was 
something new that placed Commission at a central position. The role of the Commission was
unusual in the sense that they were working in a policy dialog directly with the stakeholders 
in the Baltic Sea Regionand not conducting the regular monitoring of the treaty texts.
Nevertheless, the Commission was considered neutral, trustworthy and was credited for their
work in inclusive development process of the EUSBSR. 
The role of the Commission, in the development of the EUSBSR, has been identified as an 
institutional entrepreneur. Institutional reform often creates collective action 
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problems.Therefore, in the construction of agreeable solutions of the EUSBSR a success 
factor was the access to multiple social networks. In this sense the Commission’s position was 
strategic with a high level of access to the Member States and the stakeholders in the Baltic 
Sea Region. The interviewees pointed out that the Commission was the only actor being able 
to cope with that role; the only neutral representative.
The role of the institutional entrepreneur is freer than the mediator in the sense that they are 
under no obligation to act in a manner that will seem impartial to all the principals.They are 
not bound by a number of restrictions that normally constrain the mediators or other third 
parties. This sheds light on the freedom of Commission’s position in the drafting process and, 
in addition,only whena proposalwas considered to be very controversial the stakeholders
reacted and proposed changes of the draft.Moreover,by its own nature such a process with a 
vast number of stakeholders is complex to influence. 
As a final point, the discussion on Commission’s role in the implementation of the Strategy is 
relevant in relation the credited skills and status of the Commission, however, the economical 
and personnel resourcesarelacking in the implementation. There are only three people 
working at the Baltic Team at DG Regio and this, nevertheless, indicates in practice a 
difficulty to manage the EUSBSR.
8.2 How the Commission handle and consider the leadership role
There appears to be a misfit between the expectations of the Member States and the 
Commissions own view on their role and responsibilities within the EUSBSR which leads to a 
kind of leadership dilemma. 
      The Commission is the reluctant leader of the EUSBSR and is actually trying to relinquish 
their role in the Strategy, apart from the coordination of the Strategy in relation to specific 
policies.The Commission is thereluctant leaderdue to the need to conduct tasks that normally 
should be fulfilled by the Member States themselves. According to the Commission, they are 
not the leaders of the EUSBSRand, in addition,the lack ofpersonnelresources and a legally 
binding framework makes it practically difficult to lead the Strategy at all. That is the first 
leadership dilemma of the EUSBSR. 
    The second dilemma is related to the request from the Commission to pass over some of 
their responsibilities to the Members States - the actual owners of the Strategy – while there is 
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a limited interest from the Member States to take a greater responsibility in the leading of the 
Strategy. However, the sooner the EUSBSR can prove clear and good results the sooneryou 
will have Member States ready to claim the role, and consequently, the sooner the leadership 
structure will be solved.This is the dilemma of the EUSBSR leadership structure.  
     The Commission’s EUSBSR leadership is characterized by a 'path dependent’ 
development where the possibilities of switching the institutional setting diminish over the 
passage of time so,accordingly, the longer time it takes for the Commission to find a new 
leadership solution, the more difficult it will be for them to leave that role.  
    The political commitment and prestige of the Commission, as well as, of the Member 
States are, additionally,important factors of how the Commission handle and consider its 
leadership role. The invested prestige of the Commission, in the EUSBSR, indicates a 
concernof its success and therefore, as well, in the process of arranging a functional 
replacement solution, rather than simply solving it as soon as possible.Political prestige of the 
Member States is invested in the cooperation;they are responsible towards the stakeholders 
contributing to the development of the EUSBSR. Moreover, during the Presidencies of the 
Member States from the region there has been prestige invested in their work for adoption or 
revision of the EUSBSR and the Action Plan. Secondly, once choosing the EU Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region as a prioritized area for their EU Presidency, prestige is invested and 
there is a strive for results of their work.The invested political prestige indicates that the 
EUSBSR leadership difficulties need to be solved. According to the ‘path dependency’ 
theoretical framework the setting up of EUSBSR, in itself, initiated a process possibly 
difficult to reverse and, in addition, the Member States and the Commission, along the way, 
invested political prestige within the cooperation. Therefore it needs to be revized from within 
the existing structures and a key issue to solve is how to cope with the varying political 
commitment of the Member States.   
8.3 Final reflections and further research
The thesis should be considered as an attempt to further the leadership analysis within the 
EUSBSR building on previous research and thus hoping to make a valuable contribution to 
this field. To conclude, one of the things that this thesis has attempted to show is the benefits 
of applying‘path dependency’ as an analytical tool for the understanding of the leadership
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dilemma at place in the EUSBSR,as well as the benefits of applying the institutional 
entrepreneur leadership theory on the development of the EUSBSR. Together, these 
theoretical perspectives have formed a nuanced analysis of the leadership of the EUSBSR in 
general, as well as of the existing leadership complexities. Therefore, it is highly relevant for 
scholars interested in the leadership of European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region to 
turn their attention towards theoretical models that link these theoretical perspectives in order 
to extend the present limited EUSBSR leadership studies. 
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